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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
question of defendant's negligence.5 4 (Violation of a statute, however, may in
itself give rise to liability, either "a liability created by a statute or a liability for
negligence for which the statute creates a new standard or norm", the latter known
as negligence per se.55) The Court stated this rule but also spoke of the ordinance
as imposing an "absolute duty", and its refusal to allow the defendant any notice
of the defective lighting seems inconsistent with a mere evidence-of-negligence
effect of the ordinance. Previous decisions have considered notice, actual or con-
structive, essential to liability in cases involving violation of an ordinance56 and
even a statute.5 7 Thus the present case seems to involve a departure from the
New York rule that violation of an ordinance may be only evidence of negligence.
Duty of Property Owner to Licensee
A social guest, who is on another's premises pursuant to an invitation, is not
in law an invitee but rather a licensee to whom the possessor owes no duty of in-
spection and affirmative care to make the premises safe for his visit.58 The same
rule applies where the social guest is an infant.59 There is an obligation, how-
ever, on the part of the possessor, to disclose to the licensee any concealed
dangerous defects.60
The above principles were again approved by the Court of Appeals in
Krause v. Alper,61 which was a suit by the father of a boy who was injured while
playing basketball with the defendants' son on the defendants' premises. Since the
wooden doorstop, over which the infant had tripped, was in plain sight, there was
no "hidden pitfall" which could have imposed the duty of disclosure on the de-
fendants.
Duty of Employer to Provide Safe Premises for Employees
In Zucchelli v. City Construction Co.6 2 thirteen injured employees of the
R. E. Carrick Co. (subcontractor) brought an action against the 981 Madison
54. Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N.Y. 456, 21 N.E.2d 504 (1939);
Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935); Fluker
v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N.Y. 40, 93 N.E. 1112 (1911). But see Silverman v.
Konig, 170 N.Y. Supp. 368 (Sup.Ct. 1918).
55. Schmidt v. Merchant's Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 303, 200 N.E.
804, 829 (1936). See also Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
56. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., supra note 54; cf. 1 SHEARMAN AND
REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE §21 (rev. ed. 1941).
57. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922); Schaeffer v. Caldwell,
273 App. Div. 263, 78 N.Y.S.2d 652 (4th Dep't 1948).
58. Wilder v. Ayers, 2 A.D.2d 354, 156 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1st Dep't 1956),aff'd
3 N.Y.2d 725, 163 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1957); PROSSER, TORTS §77 (2d ed., 1955).
59. Droge v. Czarniechi, 285 App. Div. 1052, 139 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2d Dep't
1955), aff'd 2 N.Y.2d 897, 161 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1957).
60. Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Society, 275 App. Div. 88, 96, 87
N.Y.S.2d 458, 465 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd 300 N.Y. 486, 88 N.E. 2d 720 (1949).
61. 4 N.Y.2d 518, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1958).
62. 4 N.Y.2d 52, 172 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1958).
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Ave. Corp. (owner) and the City Construction Co. (supervising agent) for
not providing a safe place to work.6 3 At the trial, the owner and agent conceded
their liability to the plaintiffs, but were successful in obtaining a judgment over
agaiDqt the impleaded subcontractor as the primary wrongdoer. The Appellate
Division64 reversed the judgment as it pertained to the subcontractor, holding
that no liability of the owner-agent had been established and their concession
could not be binding upon the subcontractor.
The Court's sole inquiry, therefore, was whether the owner-agent actually
failed to provide the subcontractor's men with a safe place to work.
The owner is not obliged to protect a subcontractor's employee against
the negligence of a fellow worker,65 nor does the "place" which he must make
safe include the subcontractor's own plant,66 equipment,67 tools,6' details of
work,69 or the very work he is doing.70 Generally, it can be said that the
owner's liability does not include a subcontractor's "work in progress," which is
solely within his control.
In this case the accident occurred when some vertical wooden shoring
shifted and buckled, causing the floor on which the plaintiffs were working to
collapse. This was caused by the subcontractor's employees who negligently
removed, a few days prior, a wooden form encasing a beam which indirectly
supported the floor. The entire "structure" iivolved in this accident was part
of the subcontractor's contractual obligation and all the persons involved were
his employees. The majority concluded from these facts that the accident arose
out of the subcontractor's work in progress, stemming from their own negligence
and rendered the owner-agent immune from liability.
It was the dissents contention, however, that the structure itself had been
completed, thereby becoming a place of employment, and the subcontractor's
men were, therefore, working on a new and different "work in progress." Cer-
tainly, the fact that the structure was originally created by a plaintiff's employer
does not automatically insulate the owner against liability for accidents arising in
connection with the structure.
63. N. Y. LABoR LAW §200.
64. Zucehelli v. City Construction Co., 286 App.Div. 802, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 303
(1st Dep't 1955).
65. Broderick v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 301 N.Y. 182, 93 N.E.2d 629 (1950).




69. Wohlfron v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 238 App.Div. 463, 463, 205 N.Y.Supp.
18, 21 (2d Dep't 1933), aff1'd 263 N.Y. 547, 189 N.E. 691 (1933).
70. Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Pilsener Brewing Co., 219 N.Y. 415, 114
N.E. 808 (1916).
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The structure has to be deemed completed at some point, and it is feasible
that this so-called "completed structure" could then be utilized by the same
workmen as a place of employment. It is the writer's opinion, however, that
the change from a work in progress to a place of employment must be clearly
manifested by a lapse of time, a definite change in purpose, or a remote change
in location in order to avoid obligating the owner to supervise, in reality, a sub-
contractor's methods or details of work.
Loss of Consortium as Element of Damages
In New York, it has been the established rule that a wife does not have
a right of action for damages for loss of consortium and other marital rights
resulting from injuries to her husband caused by the negligence of a third
person.7 However, in Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co.,72 an attempt was
made to persuade the Court of Appeals to abandon this rule.
The plaintiff in this case based her claim for loss of consortium on two
grounds: that the marital relation creates, rights in both the husband and wife
and that therefore the wife as well as the husband has a cause of action for
damages to the marital relation resulting from injuries to the husband caused
by negligence of a third person,73 and that the trend of legal opinion is toward
recognition of such a right in the wife.74
The Court affirmed the judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint on motion
for legal insufficiency.
The argument that equality of the sexes calls for a change overlooks
that the husband's right to damages for loss of consortium is based on
outworn theory. It derives from the time when the wife was regarded
in law in some respects as her husband's chattel 75
This language seems to indicate that the inconsistency between the allow-
ance of consortium to husbands but not to wives will in a short time be ter-
minated-not by extending the damages but rather by taking away the rights
now enjoyed by husbands.
71. Don v. Benjamin M. Knapp, Inc., 306 N.Y. 675, 117 N.E.2d 128 (1954).
72. Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354
(193).
73. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
74. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir. 1950); Acuff v. Schmit,
248 Ia. 272, 78 N.W. 2d 480 (1956).
75. Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., supra note 72, at 527, 176 N.Y.S.2d
at 355.
